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Abstract
We study markets where the characteristics or decisions of certain agents are
relevant but not known to their trading partners. Assuming exclusive trans-
actions, the environment is described as a continuum economy with indivis-
ible commodities. We characterize incentive constrained eÆcient allocations
as solutions to linear programming problems and appeal to duality theory to
demonstrate the generic existence of external eects in these markets. Because
under certain conditions such eects may generate non-convexities, random-
ization emerges as a theoretic possibility. In characterizing market equilibria
we show that, consistently with the personalized nature of transactions, prices
are generally non-linear in the underlying consumption. On the other hand,
external eects may have critical implications for market eÆciency. With ad-
verse selection, in fact, cross-subsidization across agents with dierent private
information may be necessary for optimality, and so, the market need not even
achieve an incentive constrained eÆcient allocation. In contrast, for the case of
a single commodity, we nd that when informational asymmetries arise after
the trading period (e.g. moral hazard; ex post hidden types) external eects are
fully internalized at a market equilibrium. Keywords: Asymmetric Information,
General Equilibrium, Linear Programming.
2
1 Introduction
A company supplying insurance services has a direct concern in the personal risk of
each of its customers as well as the prevention measures that they will provide to
avoid an accident. The fact that these circumstances are observed privately by the
buyers gives rise to adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the insurance
market. While it has long been argued that this type of phenomena are typical
of competitive markets, attempts to apply standard general equilibrium analysis to
model competition under asymmetric information have proven diÆcult. The purpose
of this work is to study the relation between incentive compatibility and pricing from
the point of view of duality theory, thus providing a new methodology for introducing
asymmetric information into general equilibrium theory.
An essential element of the analysis, as the case of insurance illustrates, is the
personalized nature of transactions. This is in contrast to the standard model where
trade is anonymous. For full information economies, Makowski's (1979) shows how
price discrimination over quantity is characteristic of competitive markets with per-
sonalized transactions. Because such instances may be formalized as economies with
linear prices and indivisibilities, that result is yet consistent with the basic general
equilibrium model; in particular, the standard welfare and existence theorems con-
tinue to hold. The personalized environments we are concerned with, on the other
hand, display informational asymmetries. We restrict to the simplest informational
scenario where transactions are completely veriable and it suÆces to consider exclu-
sive trading relations (in which each informed agent deals with a single uninformed
partner)
1
. We formalize the objects of trade as relatively complex personalized goods.
Insurance, for instance, is sold in indivisible packages which apart from specifying
state-contingent payments, include also personal recommendations (e.g. a level of
care prevention) as well as information about the customer (e.g. her risk type). The
general environment is then described as a continuum economy with indivisible com-
modities. In this model incentive constraints are critical; we nd that, in contrast to
Makowski's model, external eects arise which the market may fail to internalize.
There are two main parts to the analysis. The rst part characterizes incentive
constrained eÆcient allocations as optimal solutions to linear semi-innite program-
ming (LSIP) problems. As a critical nding the presence of incentive-related external
eects is identied in the dual image of the program. We argue that such eects may
generate endogenous non-convexities, and so randomization emerges as a theoretic
1
For recent contributions which study non-exclusive transactions see Bisin and Gottardi (1998)
and Bisin and Guaitoli (1995).
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possibility
2
(rst introduced by Prescott and Townsend (1984a,b)). We also provide
conditions under which non-convexities do not arise. With hidden types, it is enough
that (i) utilities are type-invariant or|as a weaker condition|that (ii) individuals
who have an interest in misrepresenting their type are no more risk averse than the
individuals they try to impersonate. These conditions in turn ensure the suboptimal-
ity of random allocations when preferences and technologies are convex. With hidden
actions, either (i) the agent's utility is separable in the action (e.g. eort) or (ii)
absolute risk aversion is non-decreasing in the action level. Moral hazard economies,
however, are typically non-convex and random allocations may still be optimal.
3
The second part of the analysis studies market equilibria. In the presence of
incentive eects Walrasian equilibrium prices|though linear in the space of trade
objects|are generally non-linear in the underlying consumption, as in Makowski's
model. These prices moreover mail fail to internalize the incentive eects, leading to
a market failure. In particular, competitive markets need not achieve an incentive
constrained eÆcient allocation in adverse selection economies. We identify the reason
for this failure as the existence (prior to the trading period) of gains from cross-
subsidization. Whereas cross-subsidies are not feasible in decentralized competitive
markets, the planner can always implement a second best allocation in which the
\good type" (e.g. low risk) subsidizes the \bad type" (e.g. high risk). The implied
transfer scheme is incentive compatible as the good types are willing to pay a fee
to signal their type; bad types, in contrast, are just as happy with their subsidized
allocation. In fact, when such optimal cross-subsidies can be found, market equilibria
fail to exist unless some extra restrictions are imposed on the trading possibilities of
the uninformed agents. A very dierent result is obtained when trading takes place
before asymmetries in information arise (e.g. moral hazard; ex post hidden types).
For these economies market equilibria exist and are incentive constrained eÆcient;
i.e. external eects are fully internalized.
Whereas the analysis as well as the main results can be presented in an abstract
set-up with dierent types of informational asymmetries|as well as many physical
goods and contingencies|this paper introduces the basic methodology and presents
an intuitive discussion of our results by analyzing two simple economies. Namely, a
variation of the adverse selection model of Rothschild and Stiglitz's (1976) and a moral
hazard version of the former. The ex post hidden types model proves analytically
equivalent to the moral hazard model. This illustrates also how our approach provides
2
On the role of randomization in non-convex economies see Shell and Wright (1993) and Garrat
et al. (1998).
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See Bennardo and Chiappori (1998).
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a unied framework to study particular economies case by case, bridging the gap
with the partial equilibrium literature (Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), Spence (1973),
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and Wilson (1977) among others; see Riley (1998) for a
comprehensive review). A necessary remark is that our equilibrium characterization
describes economies with a single (type of) commodity. In future work we would like
to extend the analysis to a multi-commodity world.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the adverse selection model.
First, the LSIP model is developed. Second, incentive constrained eÆcient allocations
are fully characterized. Third, Walrasian equilibria are dened and their eÆciency
and existence properties are studied. Section 3 presents an analogous study for the
case of moral hazard. The proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper related to the seminal work of Prescott and Townsend (1984a) and the
methodology that we propose applies to the class of economies which they study. A
key modelling assumption in that work|from which we shall deviate|is that the
transactions of the informed agents are restricted ex ante to the incentive compatible
ones. One implication is that in their model equilibrium prices are always linear in
consumption, as in the standard full information model. That the uninformed agents
should face the incentive compatibility constraints of their informed partners may,
on the one hand, seem more natural. Further, assuming that the informed agents
face their own incentive constraints amounts to abstracting from the incentive eects
associated to their transactions (by imposing the corresponding shadow costs on the
agents generating the externality and, hence, implicitly assuming that such an in-
ternalization is possible
4
). In contrast, our dual approach highlights the presence of
external eects and focuses on the issue of to what extent these eects will be in-
ternalized by competitive markets. This focus connects our work to a quite dierent
line of research pursued by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) and Arnott, Greenwald
and Stiglitz (1994). An interesting contribution of our methodology is to identify
the source of the problems encountered by Prescott and Townsend's approach to de-
centralization with adverse selection|namely, the need of cross-subsidization. This
shows that external eects may be critical and indeed need to be directly analyzed.
The eÆciency result for economies where agents are allowed to trade before asym-
metries in information are generated is in fact one of the main results of Prescott
and Townsend. Because for this class of economies we show that external eects are
4
Yet, the property rights approach seems problematic given the nature of these eects.
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fully internalized by the market, the two approaches are essentially equivalent. The
key is that when ex ante trade is allowed|knowing that she will get a subsidy if she
turns out to be a \bad type"| each agent agrees to pay the fees in advance when-
ever there are gains from (incentive compatible) cross-subsidization (see for instance
Kehoe, Levine and Prescott (1998)). The problem in adverse selection economies is
that this possibility is not allowed.
Prescott and Townsend pioneered the introduction of random allocations on the
basis of potential non-convexities in the agents' incentive constraint sets. Following
their work, Cole (1989) emphasized the separating role of lotteries when the agents'
degree of risk aversion depends on their private information (see also Arnott and
Stiglitz (1988)); even with convex incentive constrained sets. Kehoe, Levine and
Prescott (1998) recently show that, in a class of exchange economies with ex post
hidden types and no indivisibilities, lotteries are never used in equilibrium provided
the natural assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) is made. Theirs
is in fact a general version, for a setting with many goods, of our condition (ii)
for the case of ex post hidden types. Intuitively, in their model agents in a high
endowment private state may want to claim a low endowment state (which under
DARA corresponds to a more risk averse agent). Our result is dierent in that it shows
that the idea generalizes to any type of informational asymmetry and, in particular,
to the case of ex ante hidden types. The corresponding condition for economies
with hidden actions is also derived by Arnott and Stiglitz (1988). Furthermore,
our methodology brings to light the theoretical ground underlying this discussion,
formally linking the separating role of lotteries and the importance of dierences in
risk aversion to the presence of non-convexities arising from incentive eects.
The adverse selection analysis is related to Gale (1996). In that model, however,
prices are embedded in the traded contracts and equilibrium is achieved through
endogenous market rationing. Individual rational expectations about rationing prob-
abilities as well as renements of out-of-equilibrium beliefs play a central role. A
similar equilibrium concept has been used by Perktold (1995) to study the case of
heterogeneously informed buyers. The description of equilibrium which we present
abstracts from these game theoretic considerations. In the spirit of classical model,
agents will optimize taking the prices as given and the latter adjust to clear the
market.
As far as the moral hazard literature is concerned, the possibility of non-linear
competitive pricing is discussed by Lisboa (1997) for an exchange economy with
separable preferences. Our claim is that this feature is characteristic of asymmetric
information models with exclusive transactions (in which the uninformed agents face
6
the incentive constraints of their trading partners).
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Bennardo and Chiappori (1998)
recently propose a strategic formulation of equilibrium in a simple moral hazard model
which claries the peculiarities of these competitive environments. Whether a reduced
form of that equilibrium can be constructed is an open issue. Section 3 proposes a
candidate for that reduced form.
6
We would like to refer to the linear programming description of the standard model
by Makowski and Ostroy (1996) as the basic motivation of our work.
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Also, Myer-
son (1984) highlights the linear programming structure of principal agent models;
an structure which has been exploited by Manelli and Vincent (1995) to character-
ize optimal procurement mechanisms from a dual perspective. To the best of our
knowledge, however, linear programming techniques have not yet been applied to the
general equilibrium analysis of asymmetric information.
2 Adverse Selection
2.1 The Economy
Consider an economy with a single consumption good, a continuum of non-atomic
households and a nite number of identical rms.
Households. Households are of two types, t
L
and t
H
, with associated population
masses 
L
and 1  
L
respectively. Each household faces two private states of nature:
in state 1 an accident occurs; in state 2 there is no accident. Whereas agents of type t
L
suer an accident with probability 
L
, the corresponding probability 
H
for an agent
of type t
H
is strictly higher; i.e. 0 < 
L
< 
H
< 1. Contingent endowments are type-
invariant and are denoted by w = (w
1
; w
2
) where w
2
> w
1
> 0. Households of type
t
i
are expected utility maximizers with Von-Neumann Morgenstern utility function
U
i
: R
+
! R (i = L;H).
8
As usual U
i
is continuously dierentiable and concave. We
also assume lim
c!0
U
0
i
(c) =1 and lim
c!1
U
0
i
(c) = 0: The model is presented in terms
of net trades, the (type-invariant) feasible net trade set Z containing all elements z
5
But see also Magill and Quinzii's (1998) study of a moral hazard nance economy with unob-
servable trades.
6
Whereas the possibility of aggregate uncertainty is not considered in Section 3, the extension is
relatively straightforward. In particular, a non-trivial (non-zero price) Walrasian equilibrium always
exists. See Bennardo and Chiappori (1998) for the problems associated to the Prescott-Townsend
reduced form with aggregate uncertainty.
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See also Gretsky, Ostroy and Zame's (1999) analysis of the continuous assignment model.
8
The analysis is easily extended to state-dependent utilities.
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in R
2
such that z   w. Finally, we assume there is no aggregate uncertainty
9
and
let w denote the economy's aggregate endowment.
Firms. Insurance companies are large as compared to the non-atomic households. In
insuring a continuum of buyers then each the company faces no aggregate risk. Thus,
the underlying technology displays constant returns to scale.
Time and uncertainty. At time zero households privately learn their type. Then
markets open and agents make transactions. As trades are assumed completely veri-
able, it suÆces to consider exclusive transactions where each household commits to
buy insurance from a single company. After the trading period, uncertainty resolves
and the nal state of each household is publicly observed. Finally, all contractual
obligations are enforced and consumption takes place. The structure of uncertainty
is common knowledge.
Personalized commodities. The objects of trade can be canonically described fol-
lowing Myerson (1984): insurance is traded in \packages" (contracts) specifying net
payments in each state as well as the personal risk type declared by the buyer. Each
such contract is a dierent indivisible object of trade. While net payments may in
principle be random, only contracts for which no agent has an incentive to misrepre-
sent her type will be traded.
2.2 Allocations
An allocation for the households is a pair of probability measures on the feasible
net trade set. The space X of allocations is then the set of pairs (x
L
; x
H
) of Borel
measures on Z satisfying
Z
Z
dx
i
= 1; x
i
 0; i = L;H: (2.1)
We show that in this model it suÆces to consider measures with nite support (c.f.
Appendix A). Letting Æ
z
stand for the mass point measure at z, we may then write
any allocation as
10
x
i
=
K
i
X
k=1

k
i
Æ
z
k
i
;
K
i
X
k=1

k
i
= 1; 
k
i
> 0; i = L;H;
9
The measurability problems associated to the formalization of individual risks as independent
random variables with a continuum of agents are well-known. For recent developments in this topic
see Hammond and Lisboa (1998) and Sun (1998). We circumvent this problem by explicitly assuming
underlying processes of individual uncertainty which preclude any macroscopic uncertainty.
10
This description is related to Mas-Colell (1975).
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where K
i
is a positive integer and the K
i
-dimensional subset of Z
suppx
i
= fz
1
i
;    ; z
K
i
i
g
is the support of the measure x
i
. In words, x
i
is a \lottery" which delivers contingent
net payments z
k
i
with probability 
k
i
to a household claiming type t
i
(there are K
i
possible deliveries).
An allocation is feasible in terms of resources if the implied ex post aggregate
consumption does not exceed the economy's aggregate endowment. Formally, the
aggregate net trade is negative if
r(x
L
; x
H
) = 
L
r
L
(x
L
) + (1  
L
)r
H
(x
H
)  0; (2.2)
where for i = L;H;
r
i
(x
i
) =
Z
(z
i1
;z
i2
)2Z


i
z
i1
+ (1  
i
)z
i2

dx
i
(z
i1
; z
i2
):
That is, 
i
r
i
(x
i
) is the ex post net trade of the population of type t
i
when all house-
holds in that group are assigned x
i
. To emphasize the linear structure of (2.2) we
write
r
i
(x
i
) = hr
i
; x
i
i =
Z
Z
r
i
dx
i
; i = L;H:
Implementable allocations also need to satisfy incentive conditions. For any pair
(x
L
; x
H
) the expected utility of an agent of type t
i
who claims to be of type t
j
is
EU
i
(x
j
) =
Z
(z
1
;z
2
)2Z


i
U
i
(w
1
+ z
1
) + (1  
i
)U
i
(w
2
+ z
2
)

dx
j
(z
1
; z
2
):
Hence, an allocation is incentive compatible if
EU
i
(x
i
)  EU
i
(x
j
); j 6= i; i = L;H; (2.3)
and agents choose not to misrepresent their type. Because (2.3) is linear on X, we
write EU
i
(x
j
) = hEU
i
; x
j
i =
R
Z
EU
i
dx
j
:
Finally, an allocation is said to be feasible if it is feasible in terms of resources and
incentive compatible.
2.3 Incentive Constrained EÆciency
We proceed to the characterization of incentive constrained eÆcient allocations. These
are feasible allocations for which there exist no other feasible allocation which is
weakly preferred by all types and strictly preferred by at least one type. Each of the
former corresponds to a solution of the social planner's problem which (for a given
9
choice of utility weights) maximizes the weighted average of agent types' utilities
subject to constraints (2.1){(2.3).
A LSIP problem. Let 
L
be the weight assigned to the low risk type in the social
welfare function. The planner's problem is a linear program; specically, one posed
in an innite dimensional but for which the number of constraints is nite|a linear
semi-innite programming problem.
sup 
L
hEU
L
; x
L
i + (1  
L
)hEU
H
; x
H
i
subject to
h1 ; x
L
i = 1 (2.4)
h1 ; x
H
i = 1 (2.5)
 hEU
L
; x
L
i+ hEU
L
; x
H
i  0 (2.6)
hEU
H
; x
L
i   hEU
H
; x
H
i  0 (2.7)

L
hr
L
; x
L
i+ (1  
L
)hr
H
; x
H
i  0 (2.8)
x
L
; x
H
 0 (2.9)
Remark 2.1 In (2.4) and (2.5), 1 stands for the characteristic function on Z; so the
former are just the adding-up constraints in (2.1) expressed in terms of the bilinear
form h:; :i.
The primal program (P ). According to LSIP theory, the above is the dual of another
LSIP problem: the so-called primal program (c.f. Goberna and Lopez (1998)). Unlike
the planner's problem the primal is posed in the Euclidean space. Its feasible set, on
the other hand, is characterized by a linear system of innite-dimensional constraints.
Let the shadow prices associated to the adding-up constraints (2.4) and (2.5) be

L
and 
H
respectively; the shadow prices associated to the incentive constraints
(2.6) and (2.7) are 
L
and 
H
; nally, q stands for the shadow price of the resource
constraint (2.8). Whereas a detailed derivation is provided in Appendix A, here we
simply state program (P ):
11
inf 
L
+ 
H
11
Prescott and Townsend (1984a) study constrained eÆcient allocations through the rst order
conditions of the planner's problem (a formal dierence is that in their framework the consumption
space is a nite set, so eectively theirs is a standard nite dimensional LP program). Our purpose
is to use duality theory to provide a general characterization of incentive constrained eÆciency.
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subject to

L
 
L
EU
L
(z
L
) + 
L
EU
L
(z
L
)  
H
EU
H
(z
L
)  q
L
r
L
(z
L
); 8z
L
2 Z

H
 (1  
L
)EU
H
(z
H
)  
L
EU
L
(z
H
) + 
H
EU
H
(z
H
)  q(1  
L
)r
H
(z
H
);
8z
H
2 Z

L
; 
H
; q  0
Unlike standard nite dimensional linear programs, neither the existence of opti-
mal solutions nor the equality of the optimal primal and dual values is guaranteed
for innite dimensional programs. In Appendix A we appeal to some central results
of LSIP theory and demonstrate that the above dual pair is indeed well-behaved.
Theorem 2.1 The dual is solvable and there is no duality gap.
Theorem 2.2 The primal is solvable.
2.4 Full Information Benchmark
To clarify the economic intuition underlying program (P ) consider the case of full
information. When types are observable no incentive constraints arise in the dual.
The constraint system associated to the allocation of type t
i
in the primal (P
FB
) is
then

i
 
i
EU
i
(z
i
)  q
i
r
i
(z
i
); 8z
i
2 Z; i = L;H: (2.10)
The rst term on the right-hand side of (2.10) is type's contribution to social wel-
fare when allocated a given net trade z
i
. Since q measures the shadow price of the
consumption good, the second term gives the cost in terms of resources the an assign-
ment; i.e. the value of the aggregate net trade of the population of type t
i
. Equation
(2.10) can then be interpreted as dening the set of feasible values for 
i
as the set
of upper bounds of the type's net contribution to welfare for any trade assignment.
Let 

i
(q) be the maximal net contribution of t
i
among all possible net trade
assignments;


i
(q) = max
z
i
2Z

i
EU
i
(z
i
)  q
i
r
i
(z
i
): (2.11)
11
Given the minimization nature of the problem, we may redene the primal as
12
min
q0


L
(q) + 

H
(q) (P
0
)
The complementary slackness theorem (c.f. Krabs (1979)) allows us to character-
ize rst best allocations in terms of maximal net contributions.
Theorem 2.3 (Complementary slackness) Let 
L
be given in (0; 1). Feasible solu-
tions q

and (x

L
; x

H
) for (P
FB
) and (D
FB
) respectively are optimal if and only if
0 = q



L
hr
L
; x

L
i+ (1  
L
)hr
H
; x

H
i

(2.12)


L
(q

) = 
L
EU
L
(z

L
)   q


L
r
L
(z

L
) 8z

L
2 suppx

L
(2.13)


H
(q

) = (1  
L
)EU
H
(z

H
)   q

(1  
L
)r
H
(z

H
) 8z

H
2 suppx

H
(2.14)
Eq. (2.12) is the complementary slackness condition associated to the (dual)
resource constraint: the shadow value of the economy's aggregate net trade is zero.
Since preferences are strictly monotone q

> 0 and all resources are consumed ex post.
More interesting are the complementary slackness conditions for the primal (2.13)
and (2.14. According to these conditions, for each type, only net trades achieving
the type's maximal net contribution are assigned with positive probability at an
optimum. The rst order conditions for (2.11) in fact yield the standard result for
convex economies with no aggregate uncertainty: if households are risk averse it is
optimal that all agents receive full insurance. (In particular, randomization is always
suboptimal.)
2.5 Incentive-Related External Eects
Let 
L
be given in the interval ( 
L
; 1) where 
L
=

1 +
(1 
L
)U
0
L
( w)

L
U
0
H
( w)

 1
: It can be
easily shown that, for this range, the optimal (rst best) consumption level is higher
for the low risk households. Hence, none of the corresponding optimal allocations is
implementable in a world of private information as high risk households have obvious
incentives to misrepresent their type. The restriction on 
L
is made for the purpose of
the presentation and an identical analysis follows for values of 
L
in (0; 
L
). For this
12
This full information economy is an example of the general problem studied by Makowski and
Ostroy (1996). In particular, 

i
(q) is the conjugate or indirect utility, redened in its expected value
form for economies with uncertainty. These authors have shown how the fact that the constraints
of the primal program (the \pricing problem" in their terminology) can be incorporated into the
objective function is characteristic of the LP version of General Equilibrium.
12
range, optimal allocations assign a higher consumption level to the high risk agents,
violating the incentive constraint of the low risk type. When 
L
= 
L
all households
optimally consume the economy's average endowment regardless of the state. So in
this case the rst best allocation is (trivially) constrained eÆcient.
Having said this, we let 
L
= 0 and focus on the incentives of the high risk agents.
Consider rst the system of primal constraints restated as

L
 

L
(
H
; q) = max
z
L
2Z

L
EU
L
(z
L
)  q
L
r
L
(z
L
)  
H
EU
H
(z
L
)
The net social contribution of the low risk type. When types are privately observed
feasible values of 
L
are upper bounds for an \adjusted version" of the net contribution
function of the low risk type. Apart from the direct contribution to social welfare and
the cost in terms of resources, a third term arises in the above constraint which has
its origin in the incentive constraint of the high risk type. This term represents the
negative incentive eect of assigning low risk households a given net trade in terms
of the potential \envy" generated upon high risk individuals. Intuitively, the better
the assignment of a low risk household in the eyes of high risk agents, the higher the
amount of resources that will need to be transferred to the latter to prevent them
from misrepresentation. This incentive eect must be explicitly considered in order
to evaluate the net contribution of low risk allocations.
A natural question is what is the counterpart (if any) of this negative externality
for the high risk group. The second system of constraints in (P ) may be restated as

H
 

H
(
H
; q) = max
z
H
2Z
(1  
L
)EU
H
(z
H
)  q(1  
L
)r
H
(z
H
) + 
H
EU
H
(z
H
):
The net social contribution of the high risk type. Once more, apart from the direct
contribution to welfare and the associated cost in terms of resources of net trade
assignments for t
H
, a third term arises. This term identies a positive incentive
eect associated to the assignment: the higher the utility implied for the high risk
households the stronger their incentives to truthfully reveal their information. The
right-hand side of the above constraint system, given by the combination of all three
terms, thus gives the net social contribution of high-risk net trades.
Note that feasible values of 
i
are upper bounds for the net social contribution
function of t
i
. Alternatively, these values must not fall below the corresponding
maximal net social contribution (given the price q of the consumption good and the
price 
H
of incentive eects), 

i
(
i
; q):
The Modied Primal. We may redene the primal program in terms of maximal net
contributions as
min

H
; q0


L
(
H
; q) + 

H
(
H
; q) (P
0
)
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So the primal is equivalent to the unconstrained convex problem which chooses the
price of resources and the price of incentive constraint of the high risk type to minimize
the sum of the types' maximal net social contributions. Let 

H
and q

denote the
optimal prices.
2.6 Randomization
Theorem 2.3 can be directly generalized to allow for incentive constraints. First,
any constrained optimal allocation satises that the shadow value of the economy's
aggregate net trade is zero,
q

(
L
hr
L
; x

L
i+ 
L
hr
L
; x

L
) = 0:
Since preferences are monotone, q

> 0 and all resources must be consumed. Second,
any element in the support of each type's allocation necessarily achieves the type's
maximal net social contribution. For high risk households


H
(

H
; q

) = (1  
L
)EU
H
(z

H
)  q

(1  
L
)r
H
(z

H
) + 

H
EU
H
(z

H
) 8z

H
2 suppx

H
:
Because the net contribution function of the high risk agents is strictly concave when
they are risk averse, the support of x

H
is a singleton. Further, the associated rst
order conditions show that it is always optimal that these agents receive the same
consumption level regardless of the state.
Proposition 2.1 Let 
L
2 (
L
; 1). In this part of the constrained Pareto frontier
high risk households are fully insured. In particular, lotteries are suboptimal for this
group.
A similar analysis applies to the low risk households;


L
(

H
; q

) = 
L
EU
L
(z

L
)  q


L
r
L
(z

L
)  

H
EU
H
(z

L
) 8z

L
2 suppx

L
:
Yet, note that the net contribution function of the low risk type need not be concave.
As special case of strict concavity is the original Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976) screening
model (see also Wilson (1977)).
Proposition 2.2 When utilities are type-invariant, lotteries are always suboptimal.
Proof: It U
i
is type-invariant the second derivative of the net contribution of t
H
in
each state never changes sign. Further, if it is not strictly negative, the net contribu-
14
tion is both negative and strictly decreasing, so the maximum is achieved at a zero
consumption level; a contradiction.
13
2
In general, the presence of incentive eects may give rise to non-convexities in the
net social contribution of the low risk type. In this case random allocations may be
optimal. Note that net trades z

L
= (z

L1
; z

L2
) 2 suppx

L
satisfy
z

L1
2 arg max
z
L1
 w
1
U
L
(w
1
+ z
L1
) 


H

H

L

L
U
H
(w
1
+ z
L1
) 
q


L

L
z
L1
(2.15)
z

L2
2 arg max
z
L2
 w
2
U
L
(w
2
+ z
L2
) 


H
(1  
H
)

L
(1  
L
)
U
H
(w
2
+ z
L2
) 
q


L

L
z
L2
(2.16)
Note that if the degree of risk aversion of the high risk type is high enough as compared
to that of the low risk type, the objective functions in (2.15) and (2.16) may have more
than one global maximum. To understand why dierences in risk aversion may lead to
gains from randomization, take the extreme case in which the low risk households are
risk neutral and the high risk households are risk averse.
14
One can then easily devise
a random allocation which is in fact rst best optimal. First, agents announcing a
high risk type are assigned their rst best deterministic allocation. Agents announcing
low risk, on the other hand, receive a non-degenerate lottery. Whereas the implied
expected consumption (and, hence, the utility) for these agents is also the rst best
one, the risk involved is such that the certainty equivalent high risk agents assign to
the lottery is exactly (below) their own deterministic consumption, preventing any
misrepresentation.
The idea that random allocations can be used to separate agents on the basis of
their attitude towards risk is discussed by Prescott and Townsend (1984b) and further
investigated by Cole (1989) and Arnott and Stiglitz (1988). Whenever the agent who
has incentives to misrepresent his information is more risk averse than the type which
he is trying to misrepresent, lotteries may lead to a Pareto improvement by helping
relax the incentive constraints. The bite of the LSIP methodology is to bring to
light the theoretical ground underlying this discussion by establishing a formal link
between the separating role of lotteries and the presence of non-convexities arising
from incentives eects
We now give suÆcient conditions for randomization to be suboptimal. Intuitively,
when low risk households are at least as risk averse as high risk households, it is
13
Proposition 2.2 holds also when lim
c!0
U
0
(c) is bounded. The dierence is that the solution
need not be interior in this case. This conclusion is also established by Prescott and Townsend
(1984a).
14
This example is essentially that in Prescott and Townsend (1984b) and Cole (1989), theirs being
a case of ex post hidden types.
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always suboptimal to assign the former a random allocation. Let the coeÆcient of
absolute risk aversion of type t
i
be A
i
. The result is as follows.
Proposition 2.3 Let 
L
2 (
L
; 1). Then, if A
L
 A
H
, assigning the low risk house-
holds a random allocation is suboptimal.
Proof: Denote the objective functions in (2.15) and (2.16) by f
L1
and f
L2
. If
type t
H
(but not t
L
) is risk neutral, the result is trivial. Assume t
H
is strictly risk
averse. As f
00
L1
> f
00
L2
, it suÆces to show that f
00
L1
< 0. Now, f
0
L1
= (g
1
+ g
2
)g
3
where
g
1
(z
L1
) =
U
0
L
(z
L1
)
U
0
H
(z
L1
)
; g
2
(z
L1
) =  

H

H

L
q


L

2
L
U
0
H
(z
L1
)
; g
3
(z
L1
) = U
0
H
(z
L1
)
Clearly g
0
2
; g
0
3
< 0. Finally, dening A
i
=  

U
00
i
U
0
i

and assuming A
L
 A
H
yields
g
1
0
=
U
00
L
U
0
H
 U
0
L
U
00
H
(U
0
H
)
2
=

U
00
L
U
0
H
U
0
L
U
00
H
 1

U
0
L
U
00
H
(U
0
H
)
2
=

A
L
A
H
 1

U
0
L
U
00
H
(U
0
H
)
2
 0
2
As it has been already mentioned, a similar analysis goes through for the part
of the constrained Pareto frontier where the aggregate consumption of the high risk
group if higher (and negative eects arise on the incentives of low risk agents); i.e. for

L
2 (0; 
L
). In this case there may be benets from assigning a lottery to households
claiming a high risk type provided that they are suÆciently less risk averse than low
risk agents. The latter, however, will always receive full insurance. Proposition 2.4
summarizes the results for this case.
Proposition 2.4 Let 
L
2 (0; 
L
). In this part of the Pareto frontier low risk house-
holds are fully insured. Further, if A
H
 A
L
, assigning the high risk households a
random allocation is suboptimal.
Remark 2.2 We have identied three parts in the constrained Pareto frontier. A
more detailed characterization applies when lotteries are suboptimal:
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A. When 
L
2 (0; 
L
).
(x

L
; x

H
) = (Æ
(c

L1
 w
1
;c

L2
 w
2
)
; Æ
(c

H
 w
1
;c

H
 w
2
)
)
where c

L1
< c

L2
, c

H
< w, and 
L
(
L
c

L1
+ (1  
L
)c

L2
) + (1  
L
)c

H
= w. Note that
low risk agents always consume less in the bad state. The reason is that, for second
best allocations, the marginal social utility of each type (i.e. where social utility is
dened as private utility net of incentive eects) must be the same in both states.
For low risk agents, however, marginal social utility is always lower in the bad state:
the marginal negative eect of their consumption in terms of incentives is larger in
15
Prescott and Townsend (1984) characterize the frontier for type-invariant utilities (so 
L
= 
L
).
16
the bad state because this state is more likely for potential high risk impersonators
(see Jerez(1999)). Thus, it is optimal that these agents consume less in state 1. The
marginal social utility of high risk type, in contrast, is state-invariant.
B. When 
L
2 (
L
; 1):
(x

L
; x

H
) = (Æ
(c

L
 w
1
;c

L
 w
2
)
; Æ
(c

H1
 w
1
;c

H2
 w
2
)
)
where c

L
< w, c

L1
> c

L2
, and 
L
c

L
+ (
H
c

H1
+(1
H
)c

H2
) = w. Whereas in this range
the marginal social utility of low risk agents is state-invariant, that of high risk agents
is higher in the bad state (which is more likely for potential low risk impersonator).
C. When 
L
= 
L
:
(x

L
; x

H
) =

Æ
( w w
1
; w w
2
)
; Æ
( w w
1
; w w
2
)

:
Only at this point of the Pareto frontier is the marginal social utility equal to the
marginal private utility (i.e. external eects are zero) for both types. So the rst and
second best notions of optimality coincide and both types are fully insured.
2.7 The Insurance Market
Consider a competitive market where insurance companies oer their services to the
households. Firms have access to identical constant returns to scale technologies, so
we may consider a single rm.
2.7.1 Prices
Let P denote the vector space C(Z)  C(Z); where C(Z) is the set of continuous
linear functions on Z. The space X of allocations is endowed with the weak topology
associated to the dual pair hX;P i denoted by (X;P ) (c.f. Anderson and Nash
(1987)). Under this topology, P is the set of continuous linear functionals on X and
hence the natural price space.
A price functional is a pair p = (p
L
; p
H
) 2 P . Note that prices need not be
anonymous as, for given net payments z 2 Z, the price charged to low and high risk
households may dier; p
L
(z) need not equal p
H
(z). Second, prices need not be linear
in the underlying net trade space either as, say, p
L
(z) need not take the form p
L
 z
for some p
L
2 R
2
+
. Even when this may seem inconsistent with standard general
equilibrium analysis, the inconsistency is only apparent: in this model just as in the
standard framework prices are linear on the space of traded objects. Given a price
system p 2 P the cost associated to bundles x 2 X is given by the linear functional
hp; xi =
X
i=L;H
hp
i
; x
i
i =
X
i=L;H
Z
Z
p
i
(z)dx
i
(z):
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The crucial deviation from the benchmark model is rather dierent: in the presence
of incentive constraints and exclusive transactions, X will always be a space dierent
from the space of consumption (in particular one of much larger dimension.)
2.7.2 Walrasian Equilibrium
We assume agents take prices as given and dene an equilibrium in the standard way.
A Walrasian equilibrium is an allocation for the economy (x
h
L
; x
h
H
; x
f
) and a price
system p 2 P such that the following conditions hold.
(i) Optimality for households:
x
h
i
= arg max
x
h
i
2X
h
hEU
i
; x
h
i
i
s:t: hp
i
; x
h
i
i  0; i = L;H
where X
h
is household's trading possibilities set; i.e. the set of nitely supported
measures x
h
on Z which satisfy h1; x
h
i = 1 and x
h
 0.
(ii) Optimality for the rm:
x
f
= arg min
x
f
2X
f
hp; x
f
i
where X
f
is the set of technologically feasible and incentive compatible allocations for
the rm. So x
f
2 X belongs to X
f
if and only if x
f
= 0 or
16
hr
L
; x
f
L
i+ hr
H
; x
f
H
i  0
 
1
jjx
f
L
jj
hEU
L
; x
f
L
i+
1
jjx
f
H
jj
hEU
L
; x
f
H
i  0
1
jjx
f
L
jj
hEU
H
; x
f
L
i  
1
jjx
f
H
jj
hEU
H
; x
f
H
i  0
x
f
L
; x
f
H
< 0
(iii) Market clearing:
x
f
i
+ 
i
x
h
i
= 0; i = L;H:
Since X
f
is a pointed cone inX, (ii) yields the standard zero prot result for constant
returns to scale technologies.
16
jjx
f
i
jj stands for the norm of x
f
i
; i.e. jjx
f
i
jj = sup
f2C(Z);jjf jj1
jhf; x
f
i
ij:
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Lemma 2.1 The rm makes zero prots in equilibrium; i.e. hp; x
f
i = 0:
Further, Walrasian equilibria satisfy a critical no arbitrage property.
Lemma 2.2 In equilibrium prices of traded lotteries measure the value of the re-
sources used by those lotteries;
hp
i
; x
h
i
i = yhr
i
; x
h
i
i; i = L;H; (2.17)
where y is any strictly positive constant.
17
The proof of Lemma 2.2 as well as that of Theorems 2.4 and 2.5 in Section 2.7.3
is presented in Appendix B.
2.7.3 Optimality and Existence
We are now ready to explore the eÆciency properties of Walrasian equilibria. The
following result is central to our discussion.
Lemma 2.3 (No cross-subsidization) In equilibrium the aggregate consumption of
each risk group does not exceed the corresponding aggregate endowment;

i
hr
i
; x
h
i
i  0; i = L;H: (2.18)
Proof: The result is a trivial consequence of Lemma 2.2 and the household's budget
constraint.
The main result of this section has to do with the problems that the previous no
cross-subsidy restriction imposes on the market mechanism. On the one hand, we
show that (provided it exists) a Walrasian equilibrium is always incentive constrained
eÆcient.
Theorem 2.4 A Walrasian equilibrium household allocation is incentive constrained
eÆcient.
On the other hand, if there exists an incentive constrained eÆcient allocation
which satises (2.18), the latter can always be supported by an equilibrium price
system provided an extra assumption is introduced in the rm's problem.
18
17
Intuitively, if lotteries oered in the market were not priced according to the resources they use,
rms would have incentives to repackage these lotteries making a prot out of such an arbitrage
activity (see Kehoe, Levine and Prescott (1998)).
18
A somewhat tedious derivation shows that this assumption is necessary for existence of such a
price system.
19
Assumption 2.1 When a production plan involves a negative aggregate net trade
with one of the risk groups, the rm rationally takes into account the fact that policies
are sold according to the population proportions. So if, for some i, hr
i
; x
f
i
i < 0 then
19
jjx
f
i
jj
jjx
f
j
jj


i

j
: (2.19)
The above is nothing but a natural rationality assumption. If the rm plans to
take a negative net position with one group (say t
i
), it needs to nance this activity
through a positive position with the other group (t
j
). As default is not allowed, this
position must to be large enough for the payments promised to the rst group to be
implementable ex post. The rm knows however that contracts always end up being
sold according to the population proportions. In particular, the more contracts of
type t
j
that are sold, the more contracts of type t
i
that are sold as well. Hence, if
it were to oer policies which required trading with too large a mass of t
j
customers
relative to the mass of t
i
customers (i.e.
jjx
f
i
jj
jjx
f
j
jj
>

i

j
) it would never be able to fulll
its promises ex post. Assumption 1 states that the rm rationally takes this fact into
account.
Theorem 2.5 Suppose Assumption 2.1 holds. An incentive constrained eÆcient al-
location may be decentralized by a Walrasian equilibrium if an only if it satises
condition 2.18.
Consider a restricted version of the planner's problem obtained by replacing the
resource constraint (2.8) by the stronger no cross-subsidy restriction; i.e. by

L
hr
L
; x
L
i  0 (2:18:L)
(1  
L
)hr
H
; x
H
i  0 (2:18:H)
The new program is nested in the original planner's problem. Theorem 2.5 en-
sures that if this restriction is non-binding for some choice of 
L
|so total welfare
is unaected| the corresponding optimal solution corresponds to a Walrasian equi-
librium household allocation. By Proposition 2.1,
20
high risk individuals buy their
actuarially fair full insurance contract, x

H
= Æ
( w
H
; w
H
)
. Low risk agents buy their
preferred contract among those which are (at least) actuarially fair and are no better
than x

H
in the eyes of the high risk agents. So, the Walrasian equilibrium is essen-
tially the pair of separating equilibrium contracts of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).
19
hr
i
; x
f
i
i represents the ex post aggregate net trade of the rm with the t
i
-group.
20
By assumption expected consumption is lower for a high risk household, so 
L
2 (
L
; 1).
20
[Remember however that our model is slightly more general; in particular, low risk
households may buy a lottery contract in equilibrium.]
In general, however, none of the allocations in the constrained Pareto frontier
need satisfy (2.18). If so, there is always a constrained eÆcient allocation (x

L
; x

H
)
which Pareto dominates the Rothschild-Stiglitz outcome. In other words, there exists
a Pareto improving transfer scheme where the low risk households subside the high
risk households. Let 
S
L
be the weight associated to (x

L
; x

H
). For this weight, let q

L
and q

H
denote the optimal shadow prices of (2.18.L) and (2.18.H) in the restricted
planner's problem. Since the restriction is binding, the shadow value of resources
is higher for the high risk group: q

H
> q

L
. Now, if each low risk agent gave up
 > 0 \units of expected consumption" these units could be transferred to the high
risk agents in a riskless fashion. Having extra

L

1 
L
units in each state, the latter
would be strictly better o and their the incentive constraint would be relaxed. This
ultimately would allow low risk agents to better insure against their risk at the cost
of reducing their expected consumption by . For  suÆciently small, their welfare is
also increased (the increase in total welfare being (q

H
 q

L
)
L
).
21
Clearly, the optimal
fee is 

=
(1 
L
)

L
hr
H
; x

H
i as it allows (x

L
; x

H
) to be attained. It is critical to note
that the optimal cross-subsidization scheme is incentive compatible and this allocation
is indeed implementable in a world of private information. Low risk households are
happy to pay a fee of 

to reveal their type and have access to the contract x

L
(which they strictly prefer to any contract that would be feasible in a world without
transfers). In contrast, high risk agents will never have incentives to pay a fee to get
x

L
; they will be (just as) happy with their subsidized full insurance contract x

H
.
We conclude that the relation between constrained optimal allocations and equi-
libria is much more subtle in the presence of adverse selection that in a full information
world. Eectively, the market faces more restrictions than the social planner. These
restrictions in fact make existence problematic.
22
21
Note that the higher/lower the mass of low/high risk households the greater the subsidy to
the high risk households for a given fee , and so, the more likely the existence of Pareto improving
transfers. An interesting result of Chassagnon (1996) shows that in the absence of the single crossing
property and if low risk agents are suÆciently more risk averse than high risk agents, the Rothschild-
Stiglitz outcome satises hr
L
; x
L
i < 0; so q

L
= 0. In this set-up the market will never achieve a
constrained eÆcient as the low risk agents would be willing to give up consumption free!
22
The idea that competitive equilibria may fail to exist with adverse selection is discussed by
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). Our Walrasian equilibrium is (for their set-up) a reduced form of
a variation of their strategic equilibrium description. The dierence is that rms would be allowed
to oer pairs of contracts|and not just a single contract. A Walrasian equilibrium is hence more
vulnerable against arbitrage opportunities than the Rothschild-Stiglitz original construct.
21
Corollary 2.1 A Walrasian equilibrium exists if and only if the no cross subsidy
constraint is not binding for the social planner for some choice of 
L
. Hence, for a
generic set of economies, no equilibrium exists.
It is easy to show that the second welfare theorem holds (the proof is based on
that of Theorem 2.5).
Theorem 2.6 For any constrained eÆcient allocation there are feasible transfers
such that the allocation may be decentralized as an equilibrium after transfers.
In general, however, these transfers are not implementable with private informa-
tion.
3 Moral Hazard
This section presents the hidden actions model. The results extend also to the case of
ex post hidden types which proves analytically equivalent. The critical feature that
these two models share is that trading takes place before asymmetries of information
arise (see also Prescott and Townsend (1984a)). This is in contrast to the adverse
selection model where agents privately learn their type before trading takes place.
3.1 The Economy
Consider an economy with two goods|leisure l and a single consumption good c, a
continuum of ex ante identical households and a nite number of rms.
Households. Each household faces two states of nature: in state 1 it is suers an
accident and in state 2 no accident occurs. The endowment of the consumption good
in each state is w
1
and w
2
respectively (so w
2
> w
1
); Z is the associated net trade
space. Households are endowed with one unit of leisure which they allocate among
leisure and accident prevention activities. The amount of leisure e which is devoted
to care prevention measures can either be high or low. This level determines the
household's probability of suering an accident. In particular, the lower e the more
likely the occurrence of an accident. Let 
L
(respectively, 
H
) be the probability of an
accident conditional on low care (respectively, high care) so 0 < 
H
< 
L
< 1. Agents
are expected utility maximizers with Von-Neumann Morgenstern utility function u :
R
2
+
! R twice continuously dierentiable and concave in c, and strictly increasing
in c and l. Further, lim
c!0
@u=@c =1 and lim
c!1
@u=@c = 0.
22
Firms. Companies are large compared to their customers and may insure a contin-
uum of households, facing (in doing so) no aggregate uncertainty.
Time and Uncertainty. The timing of the model is as follows. At time zero markets
open and agents make transactions. After the trading period is over households choose
their level of care prevention but their decision is only privately observed. Uncertainty
resolves and the nal state of each household becomes common knowledge. Finally, all
contractual obligations acquired in the trading period are enforced and consumption
takes place.
Personalized Commodities. Insurance is sold in indivisible (exclusive) packages.
Each package species both a personal level of care to be provided by the insured as
well as (potentially random) state-contingent net payments. Yet, only contracts for
which the insured agent has no interest to deviate from the specied level of care are
traded.
3.2 Allocations
Dene the set of eort levels E = fe
L
; e
H
g. An allocation for the households is a
probability measure on E  Z. An allocation may be equivalently represented as a
pair (x
L
; x
H
) of measures on Z satisfying
Z
Z
d(x
L
+ x
H
) = 1; x
L
; x
H
 0 (3.20)
Without loss of generality we restrict to measures with nite support and denote the
space of allocations by X. The interpretation is as follows. When allocated a bundle
(x
L
; x
H
) 2 X each household is recommended low care prevention with probability

L
and high care prevention with probability 
H
where

i
=
Z
Z
dx
i
; i = L;H:
Once the recommendation is made, the household is delivered potentially random
net payments. Conditional on a low care recommendation, for instance, each ele-
ment in the support of x
L
is a potential delivery with associated likelihood equal to
the (normalized) the mass of x
L
at the corresponding point. Similarly for high care
recommendations. This description highlights two possible types of randomization:
a) randomization on the level of care and, b) randomization on the net trade as-
signment conditional on a given recommendation. Bennardo and Chiappori (1998)
have recently stressed this dierence between (using their terminology) \ex ante ran-
domization" and \ex post randomization". In this model the former will take place
23
whenever both x
L
and x
H
are strictly positive measures, while the latter will occur
when (for some i) x
i
is a non-degenerate measure.
An allocation is feasible in terms of resources if ex post aggregate consumption
does not exceed the economy's aggregate endowment.
hr
L
; x
L
i+ hr
H
; x
H
i  0; (3.21)
where hr
i
; x
i
i is the aggregate net trade of the group of agents who are recommended
e
i
;
hr
i
; x
i
i =
Z
Z


i
z
i1
+ (1  
i
)z
i2

dx
i
(z
i1
; z
i2
):
Dene U
i
(c) = u(c; 1  e
i
) for i = L;H. If a level of care e
i
is recommended and
e
j
is the actual level of care provided, the household's conditional expected utility is
1

i
hEU
j
; x
i
i where
hEU
j
; x
i
i =
Z
(z
1
;z
2
)2Z


j
U
i
(w
1
+ z
1
) + (1  
j
)U
i
(w
2
+ z
2
)

dx
i
(z
1
; z
2
):
An allocation is incentive compatible if, for any level of care recommended with posi-
tive probability, the household nds it optimal to conform to such a recommendation;
hEU
i
; x
i
i  hEU
j
; x
i
i; j 6= i; i = L;H: (3.22)
Finally, an allocation is said to be feasible if it is feasible in terms of resources and
incentive compatible.
3.3 Incentive Constrained EÆciency
A LSIP problem. The planner's problem corresponds to the optimization problem
(D) which chooses a feasible allocation to maximize the household's expected utility.
max hEU
L
; x
L
i + hEU
H
; x
H
i
subject to
h1 ; x
L
+ x
H
i = 1 (3.23)
 hEU
L
; x
L
i+ hEU
H
; x
L
i  0 (3.24)
hEU
L
; x
H
i   hEU
H
; x
H
i  0 (3.25)
hr
L
; x
L
i+ hr
H
; x
H
i  0 (3.26)
x
L
; x
H
 0 (3.27)
The Primal Program. Let , 
H
, 
L
and q be the primal variables associated with
the adding-up constraint, the incentive compatibility constraints for high and low
eort, and the resource constraint in (D) respectively. The primal (P ) is
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min 
subject to
  EU
L
(z
L
)  
L
[EU
H
(z
L
)  EU
L
(z
L
)]  qr
L
(z
L
); 8z
L
2 Z (3.28)
  EU
H
(z
H
)  
H
[EU
L
(z
H
)  EU
H
(z
H
)]  qr
H
(z
H
); 8z
H
2 Z (3.29)

H
; 
L
; q  0 (3.30)
As in Section 2, the LSIP model is well-behaved. In particular, both the primal
and dual problems are solvable and there is no duality gap.
3.4 Incentive-Related External Eects
We consider an environment where high care prevention is optimal. In this set-up
it is Pareto eÆcient that all households exert high care and consume their expected
endowment regardless of the state. This allocation, however, fails to be incentive
compatible in a world of private information (given the opportunity cost of care
prevention activities) and cannot be implemented|it will always be in the household's
interest to shrink to a low level of care prevention.
We may let 
L
=0. Consider the system of primal constraints associated to high
care restated as
  

H
(
H
; q) = sup
z
H
2Z
EU
H
(z
H
)  qr
H
(z
H
)  
H
[EU
L
(z
H
)  EU
H
(z
H
)]
Feasible values of  are then upper bounds for a continuous real-valued function on Z.
This function has three main terms. The rst term gives the household's contribution
to welfare when recommended high care prevention and assigned net payments z
H
,
provided it conforms to the specication. The second term is the associated cost
in terms of resources. (If the level of care were observable these would be the only
components of the function.)
The net social contribution with high care. In the presence of incentive constraints,
a third term arises which represents the incentive eect of any net trade assignment.
Whenever it is in the household's interest to defect to low care prevention, the term
gives the cost in terms of incentives measured by the utility gain of that deviation. On
the other hand, for assignments providing the right incentives, it gives the utility loss
implied by a deviation to low care. The direct net contribution of any assignment|
calculated as the dierence between the rst and second term|is this way adjusted
upward (downward) when it gives the right (wrong) incentives.
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The net social contribution with low care. A similar interpretation holds for the
constraint system associated to low care,
  

L
(q) = sup
z
L
2Z
EU
L
(z
L
)  qr
L
(z
L
)
Yet, no incentive eects arise conditional on a low care recommendation. So the net
social contribution is just the dierence between the direct contribution to welfare
and the cost in terms of resources.
The Modied Primal. Feasibility in the primal requires that  should be at least as
large as the maximal net contribution conditional on e
i
being recommended, for any
i = L;H. Thus, the primal may be redened as the unconstrained convex program
which chooses the price q of the consumption good and that of incentive eects 
H
to minimize whichever of the two maximal net contributions is higher.
min

H
; q 0
maxf

L
(q); 

H
(
H
; q)g (P
0
)
Let the optimal prices be 

H
and q

.
3.5 Ex post Randomization
In this section the complementary slackness theorem is applied to characterize incen-
tive constrained eÆcient allocations.
Theorem 3.1 (Complementary Slackness) Given feasible primal and dual solutions
(

H
; q

) and (x

L
; x

H
), the latter are optimal if and only if
0 = q


hr
L
; x

L
i+ hr
H
; x

H
i

(3.31)
0 = 

H
hEU
L
  EU
H
; x

H
i (3.32)


L
(q

) = EU
L
(z

L
)  q

r
L
(z

L
) 8z

L
2 suppx

L
(3.33)


H
(q

; 

H
) = EU
H
(z

H
)  q

r
H
(z

H
)  

H
[EU
L
(z

H
)  EU
H
(z

H
)] (3.34)
8z

L
2 suppx

L
A series of results follow from the theorem. In particular, (3.33) has the following
implication.
Corollary 3.1 Constraint eÆcient allocations satisfy that households are fully in-
sured conditional on a low-care recommendation. Thus, randomization is always sub-
optimal conditional on this type of recommendation.
23
23
The second part of this proposition is also stated by Bennardo and Chiappori (1998).
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When agents are risk averse the net social contribution conditional on low care
is always strictly concave, having a unique global maximum. The full insurance
result follows directly from the rst order conditions of the maximization. Intuitively,
since recommending low care prevention does not give rise to incentive eects, it
is then optimal to provide the households with full insurance conditional on such a
recommendation.
The case of high care prevention is rather dierent. Despite the fact that pref-
erences are convex, the incentive eects identied in the previous section may give
rise to non-convexities in the net contribution function with high care. As a result,
there may be benets from assigning random payments conditional on this type of
recommendation. Similarly to the adverse selection model, there is a special situation
in which (ex post) lotteries are always suboptimal. (The proof is essentially that of
Proposition 2.2 in Section 2.6).
Proposition 3.1 If utility is separable in consumption and eort, assigning a lottery
conditional on a high care recommendation is suboptimal.
24
In more general instances though randomization might be benecial. In the fash-
ion of the example in Section 2.6 consider the case in which households exerting high
care are risk neutral and households with a low level of care prevention are risk averse
(so U
L
is linear and U
H
strictly concave). It is then easy to devise an allocation which
is rst best eÆcient and incentive compatible. This allocation recommends high care
with probability one and then assigns the household a lottery with expectation equal
to the rst best expected net trade. The key is that the lottery involves (just) enough
risk to preclude the agent from shirking its level of care.
SuÆcient conditions for ex post randomization to be suboptimal are established
below. (The proof is essentially that of Proposition 2.3 in Section 2.6)
25
Proposition 3.2 When absolute risk aversion increases with eort assigning random
payments conditional on a high care recommendation is suboptimal.
3.6 Ex Ante Randomization
Bennardo and Chiappori (1998) study a moral hazard model in which absolute risk
aversion increases with the level of care. Even though ex post randomization is
suboptimal, they argue that there may be benets to yet another type of random-
ization. (After all, moral hazard economies with discrete eort levels are non-convex
24
This result was rst established by Holmstrom (1979).
25
Arnott and Stiglitz (1988) derive this result through a dierent argument.
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economies.)
The underlying idea is that when leisure and consumption are complementary
commodities {eort and consumption are substitutes{ there may be a limit to the
amount of the good that the household may consume while still willing to provide
high care prevention. In terms of the LSIP model, restricting the planner's choice
to deterministic allocations (recommending high care) may lead to a non-binding
resource constraint. This is clearly suboptimal given the strict monotonicity of pref-
erences and the incentive-free eect of consumption with low care prevention. At
any such allocation the maximal net contribution conditional on a low care recom-
mendation is higher than that of a high care (i.e. 
H
(0; 
H
) < 
L
(0)) and yet
households are not being recommended low care prevention at all. Recommending
low care with a positive probability is, in these instances, an optimal way to transfer
resources to the household without perversely aecting their incentives. At the incen-
tive constrained eÆcient allocation the two maximal net contributions are equated,

H
(q

; 

H
) = 
L
(q

).
It is easy to see from (3.32){(3.34) that when ex ante randomization is optimal
26
the expected utility of households exerting high care is strictly lower than that of
households with low care prevention activities. Further, for high risk agents, the
marginal utility is not even equated across states.
27
While this may seem odd at rst
sight, it really is not as the marginal utility net of incentive external eects|the social
marginal utility|is equated both across states and eort levels. The LSIP charac-
terization thus conforms to the general notion of an eÆcient allocation with external
eects. Since no external eects arise when low care prevention is recommended, in
that case the social marginal utility coincides with the private marginal utility (driv-
ing the full insurance result). For high care, however, the marginal social utility of
consumption is strictly lower in the event of an accident. Hence it is optimal to have
this agents consume less in that state.
LetMU
S
is
stand for the marginal social utility of consumption in state s conditional
on e
i
being recommended; i.e.
MU
S
H1
(c
H1
) = U
0
H
(c
H1
) + 
H
[U
0
H
(c
H1
) 

L

H
U
0
L
(c
H1
)] MU
S
L1
(c
L1
) = U
0
L
(c
L1
)
MU
S
H2
(c
H2
) = U
0
H
(c
H2
) + 
H
[U
0
H
(c
H2
) 
(1 
L
)
(1 
H
)
U
0
L
(c
H2
)] MU
S
L2
(c
L2
) = U
0
L
(c
L2
)
Proposition 3.3 In the Bennardo-Chiappori model q

=MU
S
is
(w
s
+ z

is
); 8i; 8s.
26
See Bennardo and Chiappori (1998) for suÆcient conditions.
27
For a related discussion see Bennardo (1998).
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3.7 The Insurance Market
Consider an insurance market similar to that in Section 2.7.2.
Let P = C(Z)C(Z). We shall consider the weak topology (X;P ) on X, which
makes P the natural price space. Given a price system p 2 P , the cost of a bundle
x 2 X is given by the linear functional
hp; xi =
X
i=L;H
hp
i
; x
i
i:
3.7.1 Walrasian Equilibrium
A Walrasian equilibrium is an allocation for the economy (x
h
; x
f
) and a price system
p 2 P such that the following conditions hold.
(i) Optimality for the households:
x
h
= arg max
x
h
2X
h
hEU; x
h
i
s:t: hp; x
h
i  0;
where X
h
= f(x
h
L
; x
h
H
) 2 X :
P
i=L;H
h1; x
h
i
i = 1; x
h
i
 0; i = L;Hg is the household's
trading possibilities set.
(ii) Optimality for the rm:
x
f
= arg min
x
f
2X
f
hp; x
f
i
where X
f
is the set of production plans which are technologically feasible and incentive
compatible; i.e. x
f
= (x
f
L
; x
f
H
) 2 X belongs to X
f
if and only if
 hEU
L
; x
f
L
i+ hEU
H
; x
f
L
i  0
hEU
L
; x
f
H
i   hEU
H
; x
f
H
i  0
hr
L
; x
f
L
i+ hr
H
; x
f
H
i  0
x
f
L
; x
f
H
 0:
(iii) Market clearing:
x
f
+ x
h
= 0:
Since X
f
is a pointed cone, (ii) implies the following.
Lemma 3.1 The rm makes zero prots in equilibrium; i.e.hp; x
f
i = 0.
In addition, the following is a critical no-arbitrage property of equilibrium.
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Lemma 3.2 Equilibrium allocations are priced according to the amount resources
which are used conditional on any given care recommendation.
hp
i
; x
h
i
i = yhr
i
; x
h
i
i:
where y is any strictly positive constant.
Proof: The proof is identical to that of lemma 2.2.
3.7.2 Optimality
As the main result in this section we establish the existence of a one-to-one correspon-
dence between Walrasian equilibria and incentive constrained eÆcient allocations.
Theorem 3.2 A Walrasian equilibrium household allocation is incentive constrained
eÆcient. Conversely, an incentive constrained eÆcient allocation can be decentralized
as a Walrasian equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix B
In the light of the previous theorem, the existence of optimal solutions to the
planner's problem guarantees also the existence of an equilibrium.
Theorem 3.3 A Walrasian equilibrium always exists.
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Appendix A
A.1 The Primal Program
Let R
n
be equipped with the Euclidean norm and partially ordered by means of the
cone
K
n
m
= f y = (y
1
; :::; y
n
) 2 R
n
: y
j
 0; j = 1; :::; m; 0  m  ng:
Given w 2 R
2
+
; dene the set Z = f z 2 R
2
: z   w g: Let the vector space
C(Z) of continuous real-valued functions on Z, endowed with the topology of uniform
convergence on compact sets, be partially ordered by means of the cone
C
+
(Z) = f f 2 C(Z) : f(z)  0 8z 2 Z g:
Let a vector c 2 R
n
; a continuous linear mapping A : R
n
! C(Z)  C(Z), and a
xed element b 2 C(Z) C(Z) be given.
Problem (P). The primal LSIP program, with value (P ), is
inf c  y
s:t: Ay  b
y 2 K
n
m
:
A.2 The Standard Dual
Let C(Z)C(Z) be paired in duality with its topological dual space, M
c
(Z)M
c
(Z);
i.e. M
c
(Z) is the space of compactly supported signed Borel measures on Z which
are nite on compact sets (c.f. Hewitt (1959)). The reexive space R
n
is paired with
itself. The two pairings are endowed with their natural bilinear forms. [The notation
below highlights the dimensionality of the spaces in the pairing: whereas the dot
product notation applies to nite dimensions, h :; : i is used for innite dimensional
spaces.]
hf; xi =
Z
Z
f
L
dx
L
+
Z
Z
f
H
dx
H
; f = (f
L
; f
H
) 2 C(Z) C(Z) (A.1)
x = (x
L
; x
H
) 2 M
c
(Z)M
c
(Z)
y  z =
n
X
j=1
y
j
z
j
; y 2 R
n
; z 2 R
n
: (A.2)
The mapping A

: M
c
(Z)M
c
(Z)! R
n
which is adjoint to A is dened by
y  (A

x) = hAy; xi 8x 2M
c
+
(Z)M
c
+
(Z); 8y 2 K
n
m
: (A.3)
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Program (D
S
). The dual of (P ); with value (D
S
); is posed in M
c
(Z)M
c
(Z) as
inf hb; xi
s:t: A

x  c
x  0:
Yet, we may write Ay =
P
n
j=1
y
j
f
j
where f
j
= (f
jL
; f
jH
) 2 C(Z)  C(Z); j =
1;    ; n; so
y  (A

x) =
n
X
j=1
y
j
hf
j
; xi 8y 2 K
n
m
; 8x 2M
c
+
(Z)M
c
+
(Z)
The statement A

x  c is then equivalent to
n
X
i=1
y
j
(hf
j
; xi   c
j
)  0 8y = (y
1
; :::; y
n
) 2 K
n
m
and (D
S
) can be expressed as
sup hb; xi
s:t: hf
j
; xi  c
j
; j = 1; :::; m
hf
j
; xi = c
j
; j = m+ 1; :::; n
x  0:
A.3 The Haar Dual
Let R
(Z)
be the vector space of all functions 
i
: Z ! R which vanish outside a nite
subset of Z; the so-called supporting set of 
i
(supp 
i
= fz
i
2 Z : 
i
(z
i
) 6= 0g). The
elements of R
(Z)
are known as generalized nite sequences in R (c.f. Goberna and
Lopez (1998)). Following Charnes et al. (1963), let C(Z)C(Z) be paired in duality
with R
(Z)
R
(Z)
, with associated bilinear form
hf; i =
X
z
L
2supp
L
f
L
(z
L
)
L
(z
L
) +
X
z
H
2supp
H
f
H
(z
H
)
H
(z
H
)
f = (f
L
; f
H
) 2 C(Z) C(Z);  = (
L
; 
H
) 2 R
(Z)
R
(Z)
:
Program (D
H
). A similar derivation to that in Section A.2 gives the dual problem
in Haar's sense, with value (D
H
).
sup hb; i
s:t: hf
j
; i  c
j
; j = 1; :::; m
hf
j
; i = c
j
; j = m + 1; :::; n
  0:
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Adverse Selection Moral Hazard
(n;m) (5; 3) (4; 3)
y (
L
; 
H
; q; 
L
; 
H
) (
L
; 
H
; q; )
c (0; 0; 0; 1; 1) (0; 0; 0; 1)
b (
L
EU
L
; (1  
L
)EU
H
) (EU
L
; EU
H
)
f
1
( EU
L
; EU
L
) ( EU
L
+ EU
H
; 0)
f
2
(EU
H
; EU
H
) (0; EU
L
  EU
H
)
f
3
(
L
r
L
; (1  
L
)r
H
) (r
L
; r
H
)
f
4
(1; 0) (1; 1)
f
5
(0; 1) |{
Table i: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Models
Any pair  = (
L
; 
H
) 2 R
(Z)
R
(Z)
gives rise to a pair of nitely supported measures
x = (x
L
; x
H
) where, for example, x
L
=
P
z
L
2supp 
L

L
(z
L
)Æ
z
L
. Formally, R
(Z)
R
(Z)
is isomorphic to the space X of allocations dened in Sections 2 and 3. It can be seen
from Table i that (D
H
) stands for the planner's problem in each such section.
A.4 Existence of Optimal Solutions and No Duality Gap
Because R
(Z)
R
(Z)
is isomorphic to a subspace of M
c
(Z)M
c
(Z), (D
H
)  (D
S
).
The weak duality theorem for f(P ); (D
S
)g (c.f. Krabs (1979)) implies then
(D
H
)  (D
S
)  (P );
so the pair f(P ); (D
H
)g satises also the weak duality inequality. We shall show that
(D
H
) = (P ), so it is in fact suÆcient to consider the Haar pair. The following fact
regarding the system of primal constraints is critical in the proof.
Lemma A.1 There exists a compact subset T  Z such that all primal constraints
associated to elements in ZjT may be eliminated without altering the set of optimal
solutions.
Proof: Let Y denote the set of feasible primal solutions (a closed convex subset
of R
n
). Any y 2 Y satises
0  h
L
(z
L
; y) = b
L
(z
L
) 
n
X
j=1
y
j
f
jL
(z
L
) 8z
L
2 Z (A.4)
0  h
H
(z
H
; y) = b
H
(z
H
) 
n
X
j=1
y
j
f
jH
(z
H
) 8z
H
2 Z (A.5)
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Since preferences are convex, it is easy to see from Table i that this system is consis-
tent. We establish the Lemma through a sequence of claims.
Claim 1: There exist M
j
; j = 1; : : : ; n such that all optimal primal solutions lie in
the set M = fy 2 Y : y
j
M
j
; j = 1; : : : ; ng:
Since feasible solutions for (P ) belong to K
n
m
and satisfy (A.4) and (A.5), it is clear
from Table A.5 that Y is bounded below. For j = fn m+1; : : : ; ng the existence of
M
j
follows from the objective of (P ), which chooses y 2 Y to minimize
P
n
j=n m+1
y
j
.
Finally, any optimal solution y

must satisfy (A.4) and (A.5) with strict equality, so
y

j
is bounded above for j = f1; : : : ; n mg.
Claim 2: There is  > 0 such that y
n m
>  8y 2M .
Assume not. Then there is a sequence fy
k
g in M such that 0  y
k
n m
<
1
k
for all
k 2 N. Since one of the incentive constraint will always be redundant (this is obvious
with moral hazard and was established in Section 2 for the case of adverse selection),
without loss of generality we let y
1
= 0. Table i implies then that for some i 2 fL;Hg
and all y 2 Y
0  h
i
(z
i
; y)  b
i
(z
i
)  y
n m
f
n m
i(z
i
)  y
n
; 8z
i
2 Z
Let y = y
k
. Rearranging and taking limits,
lim
k
y
k
n
 b
i
(z
i
)  lim
k
y
k
n m
f
n m
i(z
i
) = b
i
(z
i
); 8z
i
2 Z:
Hence, lim
k
y
k
n
 b
i
(z
i
); 8z
i
2 Z:
It utility is unbounded, lim
k
y
k
n m+1
= 1, contradicting Claim 1. If utility is
bounded, lim
z
i
!1
b
i
(z
i
) = B
i
, M
n
can then always be found in (0; B
i
); leading to a
similar contradiction.
Claim 3: There is z such that, 8y 2M and 8i 2 fL;Hg; rh
i
(z
i
; y) 2 R
2
++
8z
i
 z:
Without loss of generality, take i = L. Note that rf
jL
= 0; j = n   m + 1; : : : ; n.
Also, rf
n m;L
(z
L
) = g
L
2 R
2
++
. Hence,
rh
L
(z
L
; y) = rb
L
(z
L
) 
n m
X
j=1
y
j
rf
jL
(z
L
)
= rb
L
(z
L
) 
n m 1
X
j=1
y
j
(rf
+
jL
(z
L
) rf
 
jL
(z
L
))  y
n m
rf
n m;L
(z
L
)
Where, rf
j
L
+
;rf
 
jL
 0 stand for the positive and negative parts of rf
jL
.
Claims 1 and 2 imply then
rh
L
(z
L
; y)  rb
L
(z
L
) +
n m 1
X
j=1
M
j
rf
j
L
 
(z
L
)  g
L
8z
L
2 Z
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Because marginal utility decreases asymptotically to zero,
lim
z
L
!+1
rb
L
(z
L
) = 0
lim
z
L
!+1
rf
j
L(z
L
) = 0; j = f1; : : : ; n m  1g
Hence,
lim
z
L
!+1
rh
L
(z
L
; y) =  g
L
<< 0
Since h
L
(:; y) is a continuously dierentiable map, there is z
L
such thatrh
L
(z
L
; y) <<
0 for all z
L
> z
L
.
A similar derivation gives z
H
. Let z = maxfz
L
; z
H
g.
Finally, by Claim 3, set T = [ w
1
; z] [ w
2
; z] satises the lemma. 2
Consider the pair f(P
T
); (D
T
H
)g which arises by replacing Z by T in the primal
and (Haar) dual programs. We establish the following.
Lemma A.2 The system of constraints in (P
T
) is canonically closed in the sense of
Charnes et al. (1965).
Proof. First, since T is compact and b and f
j
, j = 1; :::n, correspond to pairs of
continuous functions, the set
f(f
1
(t); f
2
(t); : : : ; f
n
(t); b(t)) : t 2 Tg
is compact in R
n+1
.
Second, the Slater qualication constraint is satised; e.g. take y
0
1
=    =
y
0
n m 1
= 0. The map f
n m
is linear and (given the convexity of preferences) b
corresponds to a pair of concave functions. Hence, there exist constants Æ
L
> 0 and
Æ
H
> 0 and values for y
0
n m
;    ; y
0
n
such that,
Æ
L
 h
L
(z
L
; y
0
) = b
L
(z
L
)  y
0
n m
f
n m
L
(z
L
)  y
0
n m+1
; 8z
L
2 Z
Æ
H
 h
H
(z
H
; y
0
) = b
H
(z
H
)  y
0
n m
f
n m
H
(z
H
)  y
0
n
; 8z
H
2 Z
making y
0
a Slater point. 2
Lemma A.3 (D
T
H
) is attained and (P
T
) = (D
T
H
).
Proof. Given Lemma A.2, the inhomogeneous Haar theorem of Charnes et al.
(1965) implies that the system of constraints in (P
T
) has the Farkas-Minkoswki prop-
erty. Since (P
T
) and (D
T
H
) are consistent, the extended duality theorem of Charnes
et al. (1962, 1963) implies then that (D
T
H
) is solvable and (D
T
H
) = (P
T
). 2
Given the previous results the proof of Theorem 2.1 is readily established.
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Proof of Theorem 2.1. Since R
(T )
 R
(Z)
, (D
T
H
)  (D
H
). By Lemma
A.1, (P ) = (P
T
). Weak duality of the pair f(P ); (D
H
)g and Lemma A.3 imply
(P ) = (D
H
). Further, the solvability of (D
T
H
) guarantees that of (D
H
) as both
programs have the same value. 2
Proof of Theorem 2.2. Y is closed, and by Claim 1 in Lemma A.1, may be
assumed bounded. Hence, the primal program is equivalent to a program that maxi-
mizes a continuous function on a compact set, and so, its value is attained.2
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Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 2.2. It suÆces to show that there exists y  0 such that hp
i
; x
f
i
i =
yhr
i
; x
f
i
i for i = L;H.
We rst show that hr
i
; x
f
i
i = 0 implies hp
i
; x
f
i
i = 0. Without loss of generality,
let i = L and assume hp
L
; x
f
L
i < 0 instead. Let x^
f
= (x
f
L
; x
f
H
) with  > 1. Since
x
f
2 X
f
, also x^
f
2 X
f
. Further, hp
L
; x^
f
L
i = hp
L
; x
f
L
i < hp
L
; x
f
L
i: So hp; x^
f
i < hp; x
f
i;
contradicting (ii). A similar argument applies for hp
L
; x
f
L
i > 0 letting  < 1.
Second, if hr
i
; x
f
i
i 6= 0 for i = L;H,
hp
L
; x
f
L
i
hr
L
; x
f
L
i
=
hp
H
; x
f
H
i
hr
H
; x
f
H
i
: (B.1)
When hp
H
; x
f
H
i = 0, B.1 follows trivially from Lemma 2.1. Let hp
H
; x
f
H
i 6= 0 and
assume, without loss of generality, that left-hand side of (B.1) exceeds the right-hand
side. Since x
f
2 X
f
,
hp
L
; x
f
L
i
hp
H
; x
f
H
i
>
hr
L
; x
f
L
i
hr
H
; x
f
H
i
  1:
Thus, hp
L
; x
f
L
i+ hp
H
; x
f
H
i > 0; contradicting Lemma 2.1.
Finally, for any i the sign of hp
i
; x
f
i
i equals that of hr
i
; x
f
i
i. Say i = L. Suppose
hp
L
; x
f
L
i < 0 and hr
L
; x
f
L
i > 0. The bundle x^
f
= (x
f
L
; x
f
H
) with  > 1 is in X
f
.
But hp; x^
f
i < hp; x
f
i, contradicting (ii). A similar argument goes through when
hp
L
; x
f
L
i > 0 and hr
L
; x
f
L
i < 0 letting  < 1. 2
Lemma B.1 There is an array (
f
L
; 
f
H
;


f
L
;


f
H
; q
f
) 2 R
5
such that 
f
L
+ 
f
H
= 0,


f
L
;


f
H
; q
f
 0 and

f
L
 
L
p
L
(z
L
) +


f
L
EU
L
(z
L
) 


f
H
EU
H
(z
H
)  q
f

L
r
L
(z
L
) 8z
L
2 Z;

f
H
 (1  
L
)p
H
(z
H
) 


f
L
EU
L
(z
H
) +


f
H
EU
H
(z
H
)  q
f
(1  
L
)r
H
(z
H
) 8z
H
2 Z;
with strict equality i z
L
2 suppx
f
L
and z
H
2 suppx
f
H
respectively.
Proof. Since (x
f
L
; x
f
H
) solves the rm problem, ( 
x
f
L

L
; 
x
f
H
1 
L
) is an optimal solution
for the (dual) LSIP problem:
max 
L
hp
L
; x
L
i+ (1  
L
)hp
H
; x
H
i s.t.
h1 ; x
L
i = 1
h1 ; x
H
i = 1
 hEU
L
; x
L
i+ hEU
L
; x
H
i  0
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hEU
H
; x
L
i   hEU
H
; x
H
i  0

L
hr
L
; x
L
i+ (1  
L
)hr
H
; x
H
i  0
x
L
; x
H
 0
The Lemma states the complementary slackness conditions for the associated pri-
mal, with optimal solution (


f
L
;


f
H
; q
f
; 
f
L
; 
f
H
). It is easy to show that the primal is
solvable and there is no duality gap. Thus, Lemma 2.1 implies 
f
L
+ 
f
L
= 0. 2
Lemma B.2 Let 
h
i
= hEU
i
; x
h
i
i and let


h
i
be the equilibrium marginal utility of
money for households of type t
i
. Then, 
h
i
 EU
i
(z
i
) 


h
i
p
i
(z
i
); 8z
i
2 Z; with strict
equality i z
i
2 suppx
h
i
.
Proof. The household's problem in (i) is a (dual) LSIP problem, and the above
are just the complementary slackness conditions of the associated primal under the
assumption that both problems are solvable and there is no duality gap (so 
h
i
is also
the optimal value of the primal). Given Lemma B.1, it is easy to show that the results
in Appendix A apply to this dual pair, guarantying the validity of these assumptions.
2
Lemma B.3 Let 
L
=

1+
(1 
L
)


h
L

L


h
H

 1
: Consider the array (
L
; 
H
;


L
;


H
; q) where

L
=

L


h
L

h
L
  
f
L
; 
H
=

1 
L


h
H


h
H
  
f
H
;


L
=


f
L
;


H
=


f
H
; q = q
f
:
Then (a) (
L
; 
H
;


L
;


H
; q) is feasible for (P ), (b) (x
h
L
; x
h
H
) is feasible for (D) and
(c) the complementary slackness conditions for (P ) and (D) are satised.
Proof:
(a) By Lemma B.2 any x
h
i
in X
h
satises v
h
i
 hEU
i
; x
h
i
i  


h
i
hp
i
; x
h
i
i: For i = L,
Lemma B.1 then implies
v
h
L
 hEU
L
; x
h
L
i  


h
L
h 


f
L

L
EU
L
+


f
H

L
EU
H
+ q
f
r
L
+

f
L

L
; x
h
L
i:
for all x
h
L
2 X
h
. In particular,
v
h
L
 hEU
L
; Æ
z
L
i  


h
L
h 


f
L

L
EU
L
+


f
H

L
EU
H
+ q
f
r
L
; Æ
z
L
i  


h
L

f
L

L
;
for all z
L
2 Z. Rearranging,

L
v
h
L


h
L
+ 
f
L


L


h
L
EU
L
(z
L
) +


f
L
EU
L
(z
L
) 


f
H
EU
H
(z
L
)  q
f
r
L
(z
L
): (B.2)
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Similarly for i = H, all z
H
2 Z satisfy
(1  
L
)v
h
H


h
H
+ 
f
H

(1  
L
)


h
H
EU
H
(z
H
) 


f
L
EU
L
(z
H
) +


f
H
EU
H
(z
H
) (B.3)
 q
f
r
H
(z
H
):
Thus, (


L
;


H
; q; 
L
; 
H
) satises both systems of primal constraints when the weights
of t
L
and t
H
in the social welfare function are given by

L


h
L
and
1 
L


h
H
. It remains to
normalize the weights.
(b) Follows directly from the denitions of X
h
i
and X
f
given (iii).
(c) Complementary slackness for the primal follows from Lemmas B.2 and B.1
which imply that (B.2) and (B.4) hold with strict equality for z
L
2 x
h
L
and z
H
2 x
h
L
,
respectively.
As far as the dual is concerned, Lemma B.1 implies
hp; x
f
i = q
f
(hr
L
; x
f
L
i+ hr
H
; x
f
H
i) +


f
L

h
EU
L
1  
L
; x
f
H
i   h
EU
L

L
; x
f
L
i

+


f
H

h
EU
H

L
; x
f
L
i   h
EU
H
1  
L
; x
f
H
i

+ 
f
L
+ 
f
H
Since


L
;


H
; q are non{negative and x
f
2 X
f
; Lemma 2.1 and (iii) yield
0 = q
f
(
L
hr
L
; x
h
L
i+ (1  
L
)hr
H
; x
h
H
i) +


f
L
(hEU
L
; x
h
H
i   hEU
L
; x
h
L
i) +
+


f
H
(hEU
H
; x
h
L
i   hEU
H
; x
h
H
i) + 
f
H
+ 
f
H
q
f
(
L
hr
L
; x
h
L
i+ (1  
L
)hr
H
; x
h
H
i)  0


f
L
(hEU
L
; x
h
H
i   hEU
L
; x
h
L
i)  0


f
H
(hEU
H
; x
h
L
i   hEU
H
; x
h
H
i)  0
Since 
f
L
+ 
f
H
= 0, the three inequalities are in fact strict equalities. 2
Proof of Theorem 2.4. Follows from Lemma B.3 and the complementary slackness
theorem. 2
Proof of Theorem 2.5. By Lemma 2.3, (2.18) is necessary for decentralization.
We next show it is also suÆcient. Suppose a constrained optimal allocation exists
which satises (2.18). Let (

L
; 

H
; q

) be the associated optimal solution for the
modied primal. By (2.18) 
L
> 
L
so 

L
= 0. Let p

2 P be dened as
p

L
(z) = q

r
L
(z) +


H

L
EU
H
(z) +K

L
;
p

H
(z) = q

r
H
(z) 


H
(1  
L
)
EU
H
(z) +K

H
;
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where K

L
=  


H

L
hEU
H
; x
h
L
i and K

H
=


H
1 
L
hEU
H
; x
h
H
i:
Then, (x
h
L
; x
h
H
) satises (2.17) when p = p

(e.g. let y

= q

.) By Lemma
2.3 x
h
i
belongs to the type-t
i
household's budget set. Finally, the complementary
slackness conditions for (P ) imply that x
h
i
is optimal for the households (

i
= 1).
Complementary slackness for (D) yields 
L
K

L
+ (1   
L
)K

H
= 0 and hp

L
; 
L
x
h
L
i +
hp

H
; (1   
L
)x
h
H
i = 0: Finally, it is easy to check that given Assumption 2.19 any
x
f
2 X
f
satises hp

; x
f
i  0. Thus, x
f

= ( 
L
x
h
L
; (1  
L
)x
h
H
) is optimal for the
rm and markets clear. 2
Proof of Theorem 3.2. The proof of the rst statement is identical to that of
Theorem 2.4. The proof of the second statement is a simplied version of that of
Theorem 2.5. 2
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